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 Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior District Judge for the United States*.
District Court for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS













On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-00921)
District Judge:  The Honorable David Stewart Cercone
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 21, 2008
BEFORE:  SMITH and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges,
and STAFFORD,  District Judge.*
2(Filed: August 5, 2008)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Patricia Sinacole appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary
judgment to her former employer iGate Capital on her claims of sexual discrimination,
interference with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and breach of contract. 
We will affirm.  
I.
Sinacole and iGate entered into an employment contract in 1998.  In 1999, she
chose to change her job from a salaried position to work as needed on an hourly, part-time
basis for iGate and its subsidiary companies. Her job responsibilities changed from
supervision to special projects and policy drafting.  She continued to work on this basis
for iGate, but also performed work for subsidiary companies of iGate.  
On November 28, 2000, Sinacole submitted to iGate the specified paperwork
requesting FMLA leave for a pregnancy.  She specified that the leave would likely
commence on April 4, 2001. iGate did not respond to Sinacole’s application.  
iGate notes that it did not request Sinacole to do any work at any time after1.
January 27, 2001.
The standard of review concerning the District Court’s grant of summary2.
judgment is plenary.   Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 535
(3d Cir. 2007).
3
Sinacole took her leave on April 6, 2001.   She did not request, nor did she take
leave from any of the subsidiary companies.   She resumed part-time work with one1
subsidiary six days after the birth of her child.  Sinacole submitted to iGate her “Notice of
Intent to Return from Leave” on May 23, 2001.  She specified that she would return to
work on July 2, 2001.  On June 22, 2001, iGate sent a letter to Sinacole terminating her
employment with iGate and its subsidiaries.  
In explaining the termination to the District Court iGate noted that it experienced
significant financial difficulties that resulted in a reduction in force.  Between iGate and
its subsidiaries 2,600 of 4,000 employees were terminated from late 2000 until December
2002.  Without counting the subsidiaries, iGate, alone, reduced the number of employees
from 55 to 36.  Two of three employees who performed policy and special project work
that was similar to Sinacole were terminated: both were men.
    
II.
Sinacole is challenging the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
iGate on her claim that iGate interfered with her FMLA rights.   Sinacole specifically2
references the expectation raised in the FMLA that those who are legitimately on leave under
“Under this theory, the employee need not show that he was treated differently3.
than others[, and] the employer cannot justify its actions by establishing a legitimate
business purpose for its decision.” Id. at 119-120. Because the FMLA is not about
discrimination, a McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis is not required.  Sommer v.
The Vanguard Group, 461 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2006).
4
the FMLA have the right to return to their former position upon concluding leave.  29
U.S.C.A. § 2614(a)(1).
We have characterized the FMLA as setting a floor of employer conduct.  Therefore,
to assert an interference claim, “the employee only needs to show that he was entitled to
benefits under the FMLA and that he was denied them.” Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430
F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), 2614(a)).3
iGate successfully argued before the District Court that Sinacole cannot raise an
FMLA interference claim because she worked an insufficient number of hours to be an
“eligible employee.”  She does not dispute the calculation of hours, but argues in equity that
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of iGate was reversible error.  
Specifically, Sinacole relies upon a regulation promulgated by the Department of
Labor that states: 
The determination of whether an employee has worked for the employer for
at least 1250 hours in the past 12 months and has been employed by the
employer for a total of at least 12 months must be made as of the date leave
commences.  If an employee notifies the employer of need for FMLA leave
before the employee meets these eligibility criteria, the employer must either
confirm the employee’s eligibility based upon a projection that the employee
will be eligible on the date leave would commence or must advise the
employee when the eligibility requirement is met.  If the employer confirms
5eligibility at the time the notice for leave is received, the employed may not
subsequently challenge the employee’s eligibility. . . . .If the employer fails to
advise the employee whether the employee is eligible prior to the date
requested leave is to commence, the employee will be deemed eligible.  The
employer may not, then, deny the leave.  
29 C.F.R. §825.110(d).  iGate acknowledged that it failed to give such notice to Sinacole. 
We agree with other federal courts of appeal that this regulation is invalid to the
extent that it expands the scope of employees who are covered by the FMLA by giving
otherwise non-eligible employees a cause of action for an employer’s failure to respond to
an application for FMLA leave.   See e.g.  Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank,  223 F.3d 579,
582 (7  Cir. 2000); Brungart v. Bellsouth, 231 F.3d 791 (11  Cir. 2000); Woodford v.th th
Community Action of Greene County, 268 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2001).  It is the sole province
of the Congress to establish the scope of employees who have rights under the FMLA.  
Sinacole does not dispute this point, but instead relies upon the regulation only to
establish an employer duty upon which equitable estoppel can be asserted. In light of this
regulation, Sinacole contends that iGate’s silence after she applied for FMLA prevents it
from proffering evidence of her ineligibility as a defense to her FMLA leave interference
claim. 
 A party claiming equitable estoppel must establish that a misrepresentation of fact
was made, upon which the party detrimentally relied.  See  In re RFE Industries, Inc. 283
F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2002).  Assuming, arguendo, that iGate’s silence can be construed
as a misrepresentation upon which she relied, Sinacole nonetheless failed to provide any
6evidence demonstrating that she suffered a detriment, in the context of an FMLA
interference claim, for her reliance upon iGate’s silence.
As we stated above, to assert an interference claim an employee must show that
she was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that her employer illegitimately
prevented her from obtaining those benefits. “An interference action is not about
discrimination, it is only about whether the employer provided the employee with the
entitlements guaranteed by the FMLA.” Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117,
120 (3d Cir. 2005).   It was Sinacole’s burden to proffer facts to establish that she had
FMLA rights with which iGate interfered, and she did not do so. 
The FMLA does not provide a private right of action for any employee, but rather
only for eligible employees.  29 U.S.C. § 2611(1).   iGate introduced evidence that
Sinacole did not work the 1250 hours that are required to gain entitlement to FMLA
benefits.  Sinacole did not dispute the truth of this fact.   This precluded Sinacole from
proffering facts sufficient to establish her interference claim. 
Sinacole, obviously aware of the problems with her prima facie case, argues that
her reliance on iGate’s silence eliminated her opportunity to either delay leave until she
did become eligible under the FMLA, or take a brief, presumably non-FMLA, leave
around the time that the baby was born.  There are insurmountable problems with both
arguments.  
Sinacole needed over 250 additional hours to qualify for benefits at the time of4.
her April 6, 2001 leave.
7
First, regarding the possibility of a delayed leave, it is not reasonable for us to infer
that she could have worked more hours before the birth of her child.  Sinacole worked at
the discretion of iGate; she did not have control over the number of hours for which iGate
requested her to work.  We do presume that she would have had control over refusing
work offered by iGate, but she does not provide any facts for us to reasonably infer that
she actually did so in the time period relevant to this claim.  The record, therefore, allows
us to reasonably infer only that, with proper information about her ineligibility, Sinacole
could have delayed family leave to a date well past the birth of her child, when she had
worked the required minimum number of hours.   Yet, under this scenario, Sinacole4
would have needed a different qualifying reason to request the later FMLA leave, since
the original leave was premised upon the birth of her child.   She did not offer any
evidence to even imply that such a reason existed.  
With regard to the possibility that Sinacole could have taken a shortened leave at
the time of the birth of her child, we must presume that she is referring to a non-FMLA
leave, since she admits that she was not FMLA-eligible at that time.  As such, she would
not have had any basis to bring her FMLA interference claim.
Therefore, under every scenario that Sinacole submitted, her interference claim
could not have survived summary judgment because she could not produce evidence that
We do not make any comment upon the applicability of this equitable estoppel5.
theory to an FMLA discrimination claim.  
8
she was eligibile for any FMLA benefits.  As a result, we cannot find any basis to
conclude that Sinacole suffered any detriment resulting from her reliance upon iGate’s
silence.  For this reason, we conclude that the District Court did not err in refusing to
apply equitable estoppel in this case, and did not err in dismissing her FMLA interference
claim.   5
III.
We easily dispose of the remaining two claims on appeal.  First, with regard to
Sinacole’s Title VII claim, Sinacole fails to discredit as pretext the explanation offered by
iGate for her dismissal.  iGate clearly articulated that it terminated Sinacole because she was
a part-time, W-2 hourly employee working remotely from home whose job functions could
be eliminated or absorbed by in-house salaried employees.  iGate also produced evidence of
a sizeable work-force reduction, necessitated by a financial downturn, that encompassed the
time relevant to this claim.  The District Court did not err in ruling that Sinacole failed to
produce evidence that iGate’s stated reason for the termination was a pretext for
discrimination. 
With regard to Sinacole’s breach of contract claim, we find that the District Court
correctly concluded that she voluntarily changed the type and conditions of her employment
9from salaried to part-time, as needed, which eliminated the applicability of the severance
provisions of her contract that she claimed.    
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of iGate Capital.   
